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In a time when defense spending is under close scrutiny,
each command faces a potential shortage of funding. There
is, in theory, a level of resources, called the critical
mass of core resources, below which a command cannot
continue to fulfill stated mission objectives. This thesis
develops a critical mass/core resource model for use in Navy
budgeting and applies the model to the Naval Auxiliary
Landing Field, Crows Landing, CA. The model may be more
useful than the current incremental approaches in the
formulation, negotiation, and execution phases of budgeting.
The model provides a framework that may strengthen and
protect the command from priorities imposed by outside
forces, or, more likely, will permit commands to identify
mission opportunity costs or losses resulting from budget
cuts. The critical mass model may be superior to current
budget formats in the execution phase because resources are
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The Department of Defense budget has been flat or in
decline in real dollar terms for four fiscal years. William
Kaufmann of the Brookings Institution compares incremental
budget cutting by political negotiation to the attack of
termites.
It's very rare that they cancel a program or really slash
it way back; they are masters of taking a couple of
million here and a couple of million there. If they keep
doing it that way, and this is the great danger, you end
up with a hollow defense. The structure looks like it's
there, but if you stomp too hard on it, it will cave in.
(Morrison, 1987, p. 34)
His analogy underscores a basic truth brought out in the
literature surrounding budgeting in time of financial
crisis: Department of Defense planners and budgeters became
guickly accustomed to increasing budgets in the 1980 's.
However, since the 1970 's, they have had little experience
with cutback management. (Jones, 1984, p. 49) The Reagan
golden years of defense spending are drawing to a close.
From 1980 to 1985, the average annual rate of real growth in
defense spending was 8%. The growth rate dropped 4.2% in
1986 and 2.5% in 1987. (Morrison, 1987, p. 34) The
President's budget authority level for 1989 requests only
2.8% increase over the $283 billion in 1988 budget authority
or slightly less than projected inflation. (OSD, 1988, p.
91) Using the Congressional Budget Office's assumptions,
however, the outlook is bleaker. Before passage of FY89
appropriations, these economic assumptions forecast a 2%
decrease in real terms in 1989 budget authority and only a
1% annual increase through 1993. (CBO, 1988, p. 35) During
the presidential campaign of 1988, a freeze on the defense
budget was discussed. Such a freeze could be applied in
real or nominal dollars. Defense budgeting may have to
develop alternatives to accommodate reductions. Defense
spending over the next years may be, at best, steady state
and the unfocused incremental approaches of past decades may
not provide the best strategy for budget negotiation or
effective execution.
B. OBJECTIVES
In a time when defense spending is under close scrutiny,
each command faces potential shortages of funding. The
result is an increased need to justify budget reguests more
thoroughly. Under this circumstance, formulating models to
link dollars to critical mission areas may shift the focus
from what can be done with fewer dollars to how much is
reguired to carry out the stated mission. The distribution
of dollars among critical mission areas is key to more
effective budget formulation and negotiation under
circumstances of budget decline, and to more efficient
budget execution generally. Budget cutters may find it
advantageous and/or necessary to assess the import of
mission areas, their costs, interrelationships, and their
priorities rather than simply expecting the spenders to
accomplish the same mission with fewer resources. In budget
execution, a methodology or model approach can be a valuable
tool to monitor spending by ensuring that mission priorities
are supported by efficient allocation of resources.
There is, in theory, a level of resources below which a
command cannot continue to meet all of its mission
objectives. This level is the critical mass. A critical
mass model (Jones, 1985) may be constructed to delineate the
core dollar resources needed to sustain the critical mass.
In all three uses, formulation, negotiation, and execution,
it would appear to be advantageous to link concrete
resource requirements directly to mission objectives.
The impact of budget formats and procedures on decision
making is uncertain. Mission decisions are based on
budgetary considerations at all levels within the Department
of Defense. The critical mass model is a modest departure
from the current incremental logic applied to defense
budgeting. The model will be applied in this thesis to a
Navy command to answer the following questions:
1. Can a suitable model using the concepts of critical
mass and core resources be applied at an operational
Navy command?
2. If the model can be applied, is it likely to be useful
for Navy budget formulation and budget execution?
Does it show promise as a valuable decision making
tool compared with budgets developed using the current
incremental, and non-mission oriented, budgeting
practices?
3. If the model appears to be useful as applied to one
small Navy installation, can it be applied to more
complex activities or at the command level?
4. What impediments are likely to inhibit the development
and application of critical mass model at a complex
Navy activity/facility?
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
In developing a critical mass model, the various
missions of an organization must be defined to fit the
reguirements of the model and their components and
interrelationships explored to determine existing
dependencies. For this reason, this study will apply the
model to a command with only one primary mission.
Accordingly, the result will not be a complete test of the
critical mass model. However, a core resource distribution
across support functions for a single mission area will be
accomplished to illustrate how the model is constructed from
accounting data.
Naval Auxiliary Landing Field, Crows Landing, CA, is the
subject of this study. Crows Landing is administered by
Naval Air Station Moffett Field (Moffett) to support the
aviation units of Commander Patrol Wings, U.S. Pacific Fleet
and NASA Ames Research Laboratory. Specifically, their
mission is to "support training facilities for P-3 aircraft
touch-and-go operations, Fleet Carrier Landing Practice
(FCLP) for fleet aircraft, and to support National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) testing."
(COMNAVAIRPACINST 5450. 17A) The value of this particular
facility as a test is that it has a single, relatively
simple primary mission. The core resource distribution will
illustrate in concrete terms the minimum level of funding
reguired to support this single mission. The implication
for planners and budgeters is that as long as this single
mission is essential to all three communities identified in
the mission statement, funding cannot be cut below the
minimum level derived by application of the model without a
commensurate decrease in fleet capability. That is, once
the minimum funding has been established, the focus shifts
to the impact of this training and testing on fleet
readiness and safety. The guestions to be answered are no
longer in terms of dollars but in terms of ability to
locate, identify, track, and, if necessary, destroy the
threat.
The relationship between Moffett and Crows Landing
directly impacts this study because Moffett assumes
responsibility for support of both the facility and the
assigned personnel. In other words, numerous functions
ranging from administration of military personnel to major
overhaul of eguipment are excluded when allocating funds
assigned specifically to Crows Landing. The implications of
this centralized support are significant in answering the
research guestions.
Since this is a first attempt to apply a critical mass
model to a Navy command, some data needed for the study are
not readily available in existing accounting systems. Most
notably, no mechanism currently exists for distributing
indirect costs incurred by an operational command such as
Crows Landing among the mission support areas. A proxy
distribution based on a one-time estimate provided by the
Of f icer-in-Charge at Crows Landing is used. Unless
otherwise noted, fiscal year 1988 (FY88) figures are applied
for this analysis.
D. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
This thesis consists of the application of a discrete
theoretical model to primary data collected exclusively for
this purpose. As such, few secondary sources are used
except to introduce the topic. There exists only a single
published procedure for application of the critical mass
model for budgeting (Jones, 1985). This model is applied in
the thesis. Navy mission and cost data are incorporated to
develop the model. Data gathering was undertaken at Naval
Air Station, Moffett Field and Naval Auxiliary Landing
Field, Crows Landing.
E. COMMAND RELATIONSHIP
In applying critical mass, it is important to delineate
exactly what activities are actually missions of that
organization. In the Navy, especially, actual missions
assigned are often linked to the position in the chain-of-
command that an activity occupies. Many responsibilities
are informally assumed by tradition, which "tasks" commands
with responsibility for areas such as retention of qualified
personnel, educational counselling, and other equally
nebulous functions. However, chain-of-command and the
formal mission, function, and task statement clearly assign
these support functions to an appropriate echelon.
At each level of the chain-of-command, there are
supporting activities which provide specialized or
centralized services not funded by the command. For
example, Navy Publications and Printing Service provides
printing and duplicating service to Moffett. Pay and
personnel administration is centrally controlled for
numerous regional activities at the Personal Support
Activity, Treasure Island, CA.
In applying the model to Crows Landing, the command
relationships are very important since the Commanding
Officer of Naval Air Station Moffett Field is explicitly
tasked with operating Crows Landing (COMNAVAIRPACINST
5450. 17A). This means that centralized support functions,
such as medical, motorpool, and maintenance of real property
were excluded from the allocation.
Command relationships are defined by COMNAVAIRPACINST
5450. 17A as follows:
a . Command
Echelon Command
1 Chief of Naval Operations
2 Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet
3 Commander Naval Air Force, U.S.
Pacific Fleet
4 Commander Light Attack Wing, U.S. Pacific
Fleet
5 Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station
Moffett Field. .
.
Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station Moffett Field is
the Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) of:




The thesis is presented in five chapters. Chapter I
provides general background relating the thesis to current
concerns in defense budgeting. Minimum funding level is
tied to fleet readiness through the identification of
essential missions. This concept of essential missions is
contrasted with current incremental budgeting practices
which may allow scarce resources to be allocated to non-
essential missions. Chapter II presents the critical mass
model and assesses its potential utility in Navy budgeting.
The chapter examines the need for reevaluating current
budgeting practices and suggests reasons that the critical
mass model may be germane. This chapter also details the
method for applying the critical mass model to a Navy
command. Chapter III applies the model to an operational
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command, Naval Auxiliary Landing Field Crows Landing, CA.
Chapter IV summarizes the cost accounting method used in the
Crows Landing application. The cost accounting method is
not specified in the critical mass model and does not affect
its applicability or utility; however, it is included as an
example of how core resources may be defined within the
critical mass model methodology. Chapter V contains
conclusions on the critical mass application at Crows
Landing and recommendations for further research. The model
as developed may be useful at some levels to improve budget
negotiation as well as execution control. Limitations for
its use in Navy budget formulation, negotiation, and
execution are examined.
II. THE CASE FOR CRITICAL MASS BUDGETING
A. PERSPECTIVE
Steady state funding for defense has replaced the
increasing defense budget of the period from 1980-1985. For
the Navy, RADM Loftus summarized the problem facing
budgeters and spenders in the following statement:
The Navy needs you to continuously work to effectively
utilize our resources. .. .You must be constantly vigilant
for ways to perform our essential functions more
efficiently, including the elimination of unproductive,
marginal or unnecessary operations. It's not "bean
counting," it's financial management which if done well,
can ensure that the Navy has the necessary resources to
accomplish its mission. (Loftus, 1988, p. 3)
To respond to this challenge, RADM Loftus suggests that
a reorientation of budget strategy may include assessment
and evaluation of missions. He also emphasizes execution
utility. One model described in academic literature that
may meet these requirements is budgeting for critical mass.
Although it addresses budget formulation, defense or
negotiation, and execution in theoretical terms, there has
not yet been a conclusive test of its utility.
Budget justification, whether under conditions of
abundance or scarcity, at every stage of the process is the
central challenge facing budgeters and comptrollers in the
current climate. However, the participants in the budgeting
process are not the only critics reassessing traditional
budgeting methods and outcomes. Current literature about
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defense reform also attacks inadequacies in the budgeting
process (Epstein, 1987; Kaufmann, 1987; Hendrickson, 1988).
In his book on defense spending reform, Hendrickson
accuses budget formulators of jealously protecting the
status quo. He levels this criticism at all the
participants from individual services through Congress. He
reiterates several factors that Jones lists as influencing
budget cutting such as political pressures, either from
within the organization or from constituents, special
interest groups, or the population in general. (Jones,
1984, p. 57) Hendrickson avers that those who should take
responsibility for proposing reforms are instead strong
advocates of the status quo. (Hendrickson, 1988, pp. 49,52)
There is another stumbling block to managing financial
stress which Jones includes in his theoretical work and
Hendrickson illustrates in terms of today's military. The
reputation and perceived need for a program may replace
objective analysis of its contribution to national defense.
This masking effect may allow allocation of scarce resources
to unessential missions or programs. (Jones, 1984, p. 57)
There are many examples of choice of priorities, both
positive and negative, based on reputation rather than
analysis of effectiveness, efficiency, or mission
contribution. Consider for example the V/STOL aircraft, the
Army's Apache helicopter, or the NATO force structure.
(Hendrickson, 1988, pp. 64-65) Each program has strong
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proponents and opponents, but the competition is for
incremental increases in funding. The rhetoric of program
justification in some instances addresses the value to
various stakeholders instead of the real programmatic
alternatives. Suggestions that cancelling the Apache
program, or decreasing or suspending U.S. contributions to
NATO might strengthen overall defense efficiency and
effectiveness often are not taken seriously by DoD because
of predetermination of needed programs in PPBS and are not
easily changed by economic or other types of analysis.
Interservice rivalry and its impact on defense policy and
budget formulation is another factor that may inhibit budget
reduction on the basis of efficiency criteria. (Hobkirk,
1983; Hendrickson, 1988) Further, public perception that
the Department of Defense has received a disproportionate
amount of the federal budget and should therefore be forced
to take a larger share of the cuts is a factor mitigating
for across the board reduction. In fact, the President's
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management found in 1986
that many Americans perceive the military budget to be
nearly twice its actual size. The survey found that only
seven percent of the public can accurately assess the amount
of federal spending earmarked for defense. (Wildavsky,
1988, p. 366)
The popularity of the defense reform movement attests to
the fact that defense spending is under close scrutiny. The
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need to justify every line item and to dispel the widely
held notion that defense dollars are spent on unnecessary or
redundant programs supports the utility of an approach to
budget formulation based upon economic rationality. The
Navy currently attempts to accomplish this by "scrubbing"
the budget repeatedly at each level of the chain-of-command.
By applying a critical mass model that links dollars to a
critical mission area, the focus is shifted to: 1) what
can be done with fewer dollars, and 2) the sacrifices that
must occur in resources required to carry out the stated
mission.
There is, in theory, a level of resources below which a
command cannot continue to fulfil stated mission objectives.
This level is the critical mass . A critical mass model can
be constructed to delineate core resources for planning and
execution within the organization and negotiation with
outside agencies. Core resources are defined as those
needed to fund the critical mass of mission objectives
(Jones, 1985, p. 48). In theory, application of the model
will increase productivity in budget formulation and
negotiation because concrete resource requirements may be
linked directly to mission areas. (Jones, 1985, p. 21)
When the budget is presented in critical mass terms, the
focus shifts to the priority of mission areas, their costs,
and interrelationships. Blake notes in his master's thesis
concerning funding of flight hours that, "a lack of focus
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creates an opportunity for miscellaneous programs to enter
the responsibility network of the organization." (Blake,
1988, p. 120) Ideally, budgeting under critical mass
reduces the opportunity for budget cutters to exhort a
command to "bite the bullet" because core resource
reguirements are linked directly to mission areas.
Therefore, when the budget is cut, the command or facility
can state what the effect will be on specific missions,
i.e., what mission activities will not be performed or will
be performed less effectively. Critical mass and core
modeling also provide a useful mechanism for tracking
spending by mission area.
B. THE CRITICAL MASS MODEL
At any command and mission area, funding may be
challenged in budget review. Analysis of each prescribed
mission area to determine critical components, or mission
component inventories, and allocation of resources to
support them is the key to construction of the model. This
enables formulation of strategy for justifying and competing
for scarce resources. Budgeting under critical mass for a
state university system is the primary application to date.
This method for developing the procedure is the basis for
the Navy command model presented here. (Jones, 1985, pp.
44-47)
The cornerstone of the critical mass model at a Navy
command is defining and agreeing upon the mission areas. At
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any command, there are typically multiple missions that may
or may not be interrelated. For example, a typical Naval
air station has as one of its missions operation of the
airfield. The station also may have related or
interdependent missions such as maintenance of a weapons
handling capability. At a large and diverse station such as
NAS Alameda, CA, there may be other missions unrelated to
airfield operation, such as operation of a port with
attendant responsibilities to different superiors in the
chain-of-command. As the size or complexity of the command
increases, the identification and prioritization of mission
areas becomes more complex.
After initial documentation of the mission in mission
statements, these are compiled at the responsibility center
level and then forwarded through the chain-of-command. Any
discrepancies or misunderstandings in mission definition are
reconciled at this point. At the conclusion of this phase,
each echelon agrees that all missions for which the command
is responsible are included. It is important that
parameters be exact and measurable. These parameters are
the basis for establishing the minimum resource level
required to support the mission or mission component. For
example, in Navy airfield operation, fire fighting and
rescue capability are required when aircraft are operating
at the field. However, it is difficult to define a
"sufficient" level of fire fighting ability without
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objective criteria. The Navy specifies the minimum number
and pumping capacity of fire trucks required according to
the gross weight of the aircraft normally served. If the
mission statement does not specify what types of aircraft
will be supported, this gross weight is unknown and it
becomes more difficult to justify the number and type of
fire and rescue trucks needed. Until the mission statement
provides specifics, core budget resources cannot be linked
directly to mission accomplishment. This example also
suggests the potential snowball effect of vague or general
mission statements. Without a minimum requirement for
number and type of trucks, for example, other resources may
become impossible to defend in negotiation. Manning, spare
parts, and fuel, to name a few, may be debatable if there is
no concrete requirement for the trucks they support. On the
other hand, if the mission statement specifies that the
airfield must accommodate P-3 aircraft, the Naval Air
Training and Operating Procedures Standardization Program
(NATOPS) requires at least two trucks with specified minimum
water availability and trained personnel to operate and
support them. (NAVAIR 00-80R-14, 1988, p. 5-2) If this
requirement is not met, the facility mission cannot be
accomplished in accordance with existing directives.
After mission statements are completed, each department
must identify the mission components wholly or in part
essential to accomplishment of each mission. Mission
16
components are those functions that combine to make mission
accomplishment possible. Operation of an airfield may
include mission components such as operating a tower,
maintaining the runway, and providing crew and equipment for
contingency operations such as crashes or breakdowns. All
mission components required to accomplish each mission must
be included, because definition of the mission as a
composite forms the basis for budget negotiation and
allocation. It is equally important that every task
nonessential to mission accomplishment be excluded. In
application, it may be difficult for work center personnel
to separate the daily workload from the concept of mission
accomplishment. However, inclusion of a task in workload
does not make a component essential or critical.
Performance expectations are an example of this phenomenon.
If the standard has been to refuel every aircraft with only
twenty minutes waiting time, there may be a perception that
this is a requirement for mission accomplishment. In fact,
the mission may not be impaired if refueling takes longer.
To identify the critical mass, the minimum acceptable
performance that will permit mission accomplishment must be
specified. At this stage in the process, core resources are
defined as those resource inputs essential to operating at
the critical mass or minimum level
.
Up to this point the process is one of identification
and iteration of missions, mission components, and core
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resources. After the inventory of mission components and
related resources is completed, the phase of negotiation of
mission priority begins. This is performed by a command-
designated task force. In most cases, the department heads
would form the nucleus group. They are the focal point for
channeling information from the work center level to the
commanding officer. Setting of mission priorities and
resource allocation at this juncture incorporates externally
imposed priorities as well as internally generated goals.
Deciding on priorities by command personnel is an essential
step in developing the critical mass model. The output of
this phase of mission prioritization and core resource
definition is a fully articulated plan for budgetary
allocation of current assets and funding. When this
allocation scheme is used in budget execution planning, it
ensures that all essential mission areas are funded to
permit continued operation at the critical mass or minimum
level . In anticipation of budget cuts, the model becomes a
bargaining tool that identifies how resources are used and
exactly what will be sacrificed in terms of mission loss if
funding is cut in any area.
Armed with this plan, alternative scenarios may be
developed and evaluated to accommodate projected budget
reductions or increases. For example, alternative plans may
be prepared projecting reductions in a specific funding
category. Other alternative plans may be prepared to
18
anticipate relief from a specific mission area
responsibility. The objective is to use the model's mission
priorities to allocate core resources under changing
conditions; i.e., the model accommodates contingency. All
of this rests upon a clear definition and understanding of
how resources are presently allocated by mission area and
mission component.
Once the model has been applied to the command, three
distinct outputs are produced. First, a comprehensive plan
is in place for internal use in allocating resources to
support command priorities. Second, critical mass mission
areas are clearly linked to core resources so that an
effective strategy for budget justification and negotiation
may be developed to support and defend command priorities.
For command level planners, this enables justification of
their own priorities against budget cutting or redefinition
from a higher echelon. Third, the opportunity cost of each
activity is defined in terms of mission coverage lost if the
budget is reduced.
C. FORMAT OF THE MODEL FOR THE NAVY APPLICATION
The critical mass model is usefully displayed in matrix
form. The columns (vertical) represent the assigned mission
areas. The rows (horizontal) enumerate the mission
components required to carry out the mission. Each cell
contains the minimum resources from the mission components
19
(row) needed to support the specified mission (column)
;



















































Figure 1. The Critical Mass Model Displayed in
Matrix Format
The model thus developed and applied to a command
illustrates mission and component interdependency by
specifying minimum or core resources required for each
mission with zero slack. It may be seen, for example, that
if the total funds available for a particular function are
below the total for that row, it would be impossible to
accomplish all the missions on the chart. It also follows
that if critical mass level of core resources is not
available for a particular mission, the critical mass level
for another mission also may be affected. This matrix
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representation allows decision makers, whether in the budget
formulation or execution phase, to consider and make
decisions on two dimensions: 1) the mission area where the
cut is to be made is identified; and 2) the cutting of core
resources below the level of the critical mass precludes
fulfilling all of the mission requirements.
The model also allows accounting for resources in at
least two ways not readily available under current budget
and accounting procedures. The total of any row is the
amount required (or spent) on that support function or
mission component which can be directly linked to mission
accomplishment. If the assigned mission responsibilities
are changed, the total cost of each mission component or
support function is reevaluated. In this way, the model is
responsive to economies of scope because the total command
cost of each mission component or support function is
allocated among all the missions. The sum of any column is
the total required (or spent) in accomplishing that mission.
The smaller the number of missions, the less complex the
model. The reduction of the matrix to one column, or one
mission area, results in a core resource distribution across
a mission area. This is the case when a small command is
tasked with one mission and centralized support functions
are provided at no cost to the command by another echelon.
Crows Landing is such an example since this command has only
one primary mission and Moffett is tasked with providing
21
support functions. Implementation analysis follows in the
next chapter as the model is applied to Crows Landing.
22
III. TEST APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
A. APPLICATION
Implementation of the critical mass budgeting theory at
Naval Auxiliary Landing Field Crows Landing is described and
analyzed to test the applicability and utility of the theory
at an operational Navy command. Two conditions of the model
led to selection of Crows Landing. First, the process of
budgeting under critical mass requires participation by all
members of the chain-of-command and negotiation among the
participants at every stage of the process. Crows Landing
is a small facility with an Officer in Charge (OinC) who is
personally involved in every phase of the operation. Since
he is the focal point for all decisions, the negotiation
process is greatly simplified and the time required to reach
agreement, shortened. Second, Crows Landing has only one
primary mission area. Without interdependence among
missions, prioritization of mission components is reduced to
identifying and clearly defining the essential support
functions. The output of the critical mass budgeting
process in this case is a distribution of resources or
support functions over a single mission area. This
distribution is a valid test of the theory with a shortened
negotiation time and a simplified analysis of mission
components.
23
Crows Landing is assigned one primary mission that is
defined as follows:
Primary mission of NALF is to support training facilities
for P-3 aircraft touch-and-go operations, Fleet Carrier
Landing Practice (FCLP) for fleet aircraft, and to support
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
testing. (COMNAVAIRPACINST 54 50. 17A)
It is assumed for this application that all negotiation
regarding mission assignment is completed because the
originator of the instruction that assigns the mission is an
echelon three commander. This implies that if Moffett, the
immediate superior in the chain of command for Crows
Landing, is not satisfied with the assignment, negotiation
should be with seniors in the chain of command and not with
Crows Landing.
The command mission statement is amplified in the
instruction. Exact parameters are clearly defined and
reguired support functions are easily identified by
referring to standard Navy operating doctrine and Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. Study of the
Crows Landing operation yielded five functions, or mission
components, essential to performing the assigned mission.
The five mission components are listed below with short
titles used for ease of reference:
1. Operate an air traffic control facility in accordance
with existing Navy and FAA regulations (TOWER)
.
2. Maintain a runway with associated taxiways and aprons
including required equipment for training and support




3. Maintain and repair navigational aids required for
conduct of specified flight operations in accordance
with existing Navy and FAA regulations (NAVAID)
.
4. Maintain continuous two-way communications capability
among airfield rapid response personnel as required by
current Navy directives (COMM)
.
5. Provide, equip, train, and support teams for fire
fighting and crash/rescue operations in accordance
with current Navy directives (FIRE/CRASH)
.
Before core resources are developed for each mission
component, several additional components have to be
identified because of the nature of the operation at Crows
Landing. In studying the costs of a mission performed by a
military organization, there are some costs which result
from the unique nature of military life. These costs fall
into two categories: 1) general military duties, and 2)
watchstanding. General military duties are those
requirements levied on military members regardless of
specific job assignment. One example is physical readiness
training and testing. Every member of the Navy must meet
and maintain minimum physical standards. This results in
additional cost for time spent by each member on actual
exercise as well as time for program administration and
record keeping. Certain military inspections and daily
quarters are other examples of personnel costs incurred
solely because the work force is military. In the
application of the model to Crows Landing, personnel costs
for these activities are identified as a separate component
(MILITARY COST) . Similarly personnel expense for the
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Officer in Charge (OinC) and Assistant OinC (AOinC) is
subtracted from the military wage pool before these wages
are allocated because much of their time is spent in duties
peculiar to the administration of a military installation.
The second unique category is watchstanding. At Crows
Landing, three people are on watch at all times. This means
that in addition to the hours required to complete the
specified mission components, Crows Landing uses 504
additional labor hours per week in watchstanding. These
hours are considered direct labor since watchstanders
provide fire and security watches and are qualified as a
rapid response team in accordance with NATOPS airfield
requirements
.
As the development of the critical mass model process
continues, identification of interdependence between
missions becomes the focal point for negotiation. In a
correctly constructed and applied critical mass model,
resource allocation and the distribution of scarce resources
is linked directly to mission accomplishment. Core resource
requirements support budget requests. This does not imply
that resources that are not a part of the critical mass
cannot be requested or justified. It only demonstrates that
the minimum level for mission accomplishment, the critical
mass, is clearly defined; a cost-benefit analysis of
resources outside the matrix would be recommended.
26
At Crows Landing, there is no opportunity for
negotiation at this point since there is only one primary
mission. Either all support functions are available at the
minimum level and the mission is possible, or there is a
shortfall in an area and the mission cannot be accomplished.
Conversely, if the decision is made to change or cancel the
mission assignment, all support functions would require
reassessment. Therefore, the utility of the distribution
developed for Crows Landing lies in execution vice
formulation and negotiation. The distribution of core
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Figure 2. The Critical Mass/core Resource Model for




Regardless of whether the application results in a fully
developed model at a multi-mission facility of the type
shown in Figure 1 or a variation such as the simple, single
mission Crows Landing application shown in Figure 2, the
cost distribution criteria must be clearly specified. In a
command involving more than one responsibility center, the
cost accounting method must be uniform throughout the
command in order for the results to be presented
meaningfully in matrix form. Costs may be allocated to four
major areas: military personnel (MILPERS) , other direct
costs, other indirect costs, and excluded costs. No system
currently in place Navy-wide that links costs to missions as
reguired for critical mass/core resource modelling was found
during the research for this thesis. The method used for
the Crows Landing critical mass/core resource model budget
application is described in Chapter IV. However, it is
important to acknowledge that this methodology does not
represent a definitive test of the critical mass model. The
model can be applied where two conditions are met: 1) all
material costs essential to mission performance at the
minimum level are captured; and, 2) no material costs
above this critical mass level are included, i.e., there is
no budgetary slack at the critical mass/core resource level.
In accounting for MILPERS, it may be useful to use an
average cost for personnel gualified to do the same jobs
28
instead of segregating costs by rating. It is common for a
billet to be filled by a rating that differs from the one
prescribed on the Manpower Authorization. It is also
necessary for several people in a command to be gualified at
each job to allow for leave, illness, etc. , of the
designated person. Thinking of mission accomplishment in
terms of average cost per unit (i.e., man hours) from a pool
of gualified labor may provide a reasonable estimate of
MILPERS costs in these cases. This reasoning is illustrated
in the Crows Landing example.
The defense policy of the Reagan-Weinberger-Carlucci era
has promoted the concept that military costs could be
reduced by contracting (OMB, 1988) . For example, there are
many types of installations where Marine sentries have been
replaced by civilian guards. Some Navy schools are being
taught by civilian teachers under contract from local
colleges. For a useful cost benefit analysis of proposed
contracting activity to be conducted, the actual cost of
providing the mission support must be segregated from the
cost of using military personnel. The Crows Landing
application facilitates this type of analysis by providing a
separate MILITARY COST. The direct cost of mission
accomplishment may be derived because MILPERS are the labor
source, and the decision making utility of the model thus
presented is enhanced. The WATCHSTANDING component is
segregated for a similar reason. In the case of
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watchstanders , however, the jobs are essential to operating
the command but are often repetitive and easily reduced to
standard operating procedures. In a command with multiple
missions, a method for distributing this cost among the
missions needs to be devised. By identifying it as a
separate component, alternative ways of providing these
services may be more easily evaluated.
The second category of costs allocated are those non-
MILPERS costs directly related to accomplishing the mission
component. In refueling aircraft, the amount (and therefore
the cost) of the fuel used can be directly associated with
that mission component. However, in allocating direct
direct costs to mission accomplishment, the lack of an
accurate measurement device is often a problem. It is
obvious that if the airfield must be lighted, electricity
for the lights is a direct cost. Without special metering,
however, it is difficult to segregate electricity used for
field lighting from electricity used to operate pinball
machines at the club. A system that approximates the actual
distribution must be adopted whenever the current accounting
system does not identify the direct use of resources. In
the Crows Landing application, a one-time sample estimate
based on existing cost account categories and experience of
Crows Landing personnel is used.
Similarly, indirect use of non-MILPERS resources must be
distributed among functions or components. The key issues
30
are defensibility of assumptions (reasonableness) and
uniformity among responsibility centers. In the Crows
Landing application, indirect costs are apportioned using a
fractional rate based on the distribution of labor hours.
The mechanics of this apportionment are detailed in Chapter
IV.
Another cost allocation issue is determining which costs
should be excluded. In order to be included as a core
resource, a cost must contribute in some measurable way to
mission accomplishment. Since measurement of resource use
relative to mission accomplishment is difficult using the
current cost accounting system, criteria for the assumptions
about which costs to exclude are not clear cut. Definition
of this depends, in part, on the level of aggregation of
data. Payroll, for example, is a function essential to
every mission since it is logical to assume that the work
force must be served by a payroll system. However, since
payroll is centralized Navy wide, it is unnecessary for the
Crows Landing application of the model; and the indirect
costs attributable, if generated, would be very small and
perhaps meaningless. However, for large installations, the
partial allocation of such indirect costs to critical mass
may be necessary. This is a critical cost accounting choice
regarding application of the model that is worthy of further
research. Therefore, the payroll expenses are excluded at
commands such as Crows Landing. Another guestion regarding
31
indirect cost allocation is whether inclusion of such costs
would benefit the decision maker. In the Crows Landing
example, the cost of medical service received from Moffett
by the 28 people assigned to Crows Landing is such a small
percentage of the cost of operating the medical facility at
Moffett that the segregation of that small cost has no
effect on either command. The cost of determining or
documenting the cost would exceed its usefulness in the
model. If these costs were required, they would be included
in a single overhead rate and applied. An important lesson
to bear in mind on such issues is that information is not a
free good. Highly detailed accounting data must be worth
the cost to collect it in terms of utility to the decision
maker. This principle must be observed in application of
concepts such as critical mass and core modeling.
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IV. COST ACCOUNTING FOR CORE RESOURCES
In Chapter I, it was noted that no operational Navy cost
accounting system that contains the appropriate data for
critical mass budgeting was discovered during research for
this thesis. This chapter explains the method used to
derive the costs for the core resource application presented
in Figure 2. Figure 2 is reproduced here for reference as



























$185 995 $ 185 995
$ 25 012 $ 25 012
$ 12 031 $ 12 031
$316 873 $ 316 873
$ 92 972 $ 92 972
$445 297 $ 445 297














Figure 2. The Critical Mass/core Resource Model
for Naval Auxiliary Landing Field Crows
Landing, CA
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A one-time estimate of activity analysis data was
provided by the Officer in Charge at Crows Landing (Kelley,
November 1988) and was the basis for the distribution.
Anthony and Herzlinger (1975) suggest using the distribution
of labor hours as a convenient basis for allocating costs in
non-profit organizations. This convention is adopted
throughout the Crows Landing application. The Uniform
Management Report (UMRC) from FAADCPAC for Moffett was the
source for existing cost accounting documentation
(FAADCPAC, 1988). Interviews with personnel from Moffett's
Comptroller Department provided information that was not
available from the UMRC (Brontsema, November 1988).
A. MILITARY PERSONNEL (MILPERS)
The activity analysis yielded the following breakdown of
military manhours on a weekly basis. The Officer in Charge
(OinC) and the Assistant Officer in Charge (AOinC) were not
included because their time is spent in military duties
instead of airfield operation.
The total MILPERS expense from the UMRC was $1,045,575.
Subtracting the cost of the OinC and the AOinC, the
remaining MILPERS expense of $926 , 991 was distributed among
all the components except OVERHEAD (IND) . OVERHEAD (DIR)
includes the cost of all time spent in any capacity not
specifically segregated by the analysis. Administrative
time, meals and food preparation, supervision of military
























TOTAL MILPERS HOURS /WEEK
(work force)
is no attempt to distinguish which of these functions are
essential to performance of the mission because MILPERS can
not be hired "part-time. 11 Any person who spends any time in
direct support of the mission must be charged to the command
at the rate established by the Comptroller of the Navy.
Since there is only one primary mission at Crows Landing,
the entire cost must be born by that mission. This
aggregation of direct and indirect overhead is a major
difference between this distribution of resources over a
single mission area and a core resource distribution among
multiple missions.
Column (2) in Figure 3 shows the distribution of
military personnel expense derived from the application of




FUNCTION MILE CIVPERS UTILITIES
(1) i(2) (3) (4)
TOWER 18 038 99 282 21 266
NAVAID 15 183 1 511
COMM 2 968 7 406
FIRE/CRASH 188 366 9 349 15 961
RUNWAY 59 935 201
OVERHEAD (DIR) 225 583 18 386 28 826
OVERHEAD (IND) 40 080 59 478
WATCHSTANDING 287 687

















































MISSION COST 1 347 092
Figure 3 . Cost Accounting Table for Costs Essential
to the Performance of the Mission of
Naval Auxiliary Landing Field Crows
Landing, CA
cost of MILPERS adjusted to exclude OinC and AOinC. The
cost of the OinC and the AOinC was added to MILITARY COST as
a cost of using military personnel after the General
Military Duties percentage was calculated. Except for those
two specific jobs, average hourly wage was used since many
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of the essential jobs may be performed by any qualified
person regardless of pay grade.
B. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL (CIVPERS)
The air traffic controllers were considered 100%
essential to tower operation. Their combined salaries of
$84 .929 were accelerated 16.9% for fringes to yield CIVPERS
cost for TOWER. 16.9% is used throughout this example as
the rate to calculate CIVPERS fringes (Brontsema, 1988)
.
FIRE/CRASH was allotted the civilian personnel cost for fire
truck maintenance plus the 16.9% for fringes. This
maintenance cost was considered direct labor since the
mission component specifies "equip... and support"
firefighters.
The estimated activity analysis for CIVPERS showed that
the transportation mechanic spent 20% of his time in
maintenance/repair of airfield equipment and support
vehicles (Kelley, November 1988) . This percentage was
applied to Moffett's total CIVPERS expense for vehicle
maintenance and then 16.9% applied to the result. This
total is included in OVERHEAD (DIR)
.
The remaining two CIVPERS are maintenance mechanics who
perform myriad public works functions. The estimated
activity analysis showed 20% of their time spent on airfield
maintenance essential to mission accomplishment (Kelley,
November 1988) . Therefore, the cost of this support was
computed by multiplying their wages and fringes by 20%.
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Since this figure included maintenance and repairs to
runways, lighting, drainage, navigation aids, and other
associated airfield property, the cost was treated as direct
overhead and included in OVERHEAD (DIR)
.
Total budget authority for CIVPERS was $141,610 (Base
Operating Support) plus $53,339 (Maintenance of Real
Property) . CIVPERS expenses directly related to mission
accomplishment, as calculated above, totaled $127,017. The
remainder, $67 , 932 , is indirect overhead. For example,
maintenance and repair of general base vehicles is not
directly required to support the mission. In the case of
these vehicles, however, it may be that they are used for
activities such as picking up spare parts for repair of
tower equipment or driving to get operational message
traffic from the communications center that serves Crows
Landing. Maintenance of real property, for example,
maintenance and repair of base roads, may also be indirectly
related to mission accomplishment since personnel and
equipment must be able to reach the runway area to perform
duties such as fire and rescue operations. To capture the
portion of these indirect costs essential to continued
mission accomplishment, 59% of the CIVPERS indirect overhead
expense was included in the distribution as OVERHEAD (IND)
.
This percentage is based on the ratio of total DIRECT LABOR
hours (1002.5) plus CIVPERS hours deemed essential to
mission accomplishment (144 hours) to total labor hours.
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Total labor hours include TOTAL MILPERS, OinC and AOinC, and
six civilians.




Material includes all expenses except personnel and
travel. For example, the cost of garbage pick-up, pest
control, contracted office machine repair, and utilities are
among those included in this category.
Material expense for airfield operations was divided
between TOWER and NAVAID by applying a ratio derived as
follows:
CIVPERS wage for air traffic controllers = $84 929 = 88%
CIVPERS wage for 'Operations Aux F' $96 4 34
Total of material expense for 'Operation Aux F 1 and 'Misc
Services' from Moffett cost accounting data was divided
using this percentage between TOWER (88%) and NAVAID (12%)
.
The COMM and FIRE/CRASH figures were taken directly from
the Moffett Uniform Management Report (UMRC)
.
Runway maintenance was assumed to be 2 0% of the 'Grounds
Maint' expense based on Public Works labor estimates and is
included as a part of the RUNWAY account.
OVERHEAD (DIR) includes both materials and utility
costs. Twenty percent of any maintenance material not
attributed to a specific support function is included
because the activity analysis estimates that 20% of Public
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Works labor hours were spent in direct support of the
mission. Utility costs (including materials for potable
water) directly linked to mission accomplishment were
estimated at 59% of the total utility expense. Fifty-nine
percent is the ratio of TOTAL DIRECT LABOR hours plus
CIVPERS hours deemed essential to mission accomplishment to
total labor hours. Total labor hours for this calculation
include TOTAL MILPERS, the OinC and AOinC, and six
civilians
.
OVERHEAD (IND) was calculated using the same rationale
and method applied to CIVPERS expense. Total indirect
materials was calculated by subtracting the direct material
costs already identified as core resources ($75,171) from
the total material expense ($175,981). 59% of indirect
materials was included as mission essential.
D. ALLOCATION OF OVERHEAD
Allocation of overhead is shown in columns (6) and (7)
of Figure 3. Direct overhead is allocated among six
accounts: the five mission components and WATCHSTANDING.
Direct labor hours estimated in the activity analysis as a
percentage of total direct labor hours is the distribution
criterion. One hundred and twenty hours are added to TOWER
for the civilian air traffic controllers. This represents
the total time per week worked by three controllers since
the activity analysis estimated 100% of their time spent in
direct support of TOWER. Indirect overhead is allocated
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among all seven remaining accounts using labor hours as
estimated in the activity analysis with the two additions
explained below as a proxy distribution. Labor hours for
GENERAL MILITARY DUTIES is increased 80 hours to include
OinC and AOinC functions as the basis for MILITARY COST.
TOWER is again increased 120 hours for direct labor
attributed to air traffic controllers. The total in column
(8) is the final distribution of costs which appears in
Figure 2
.
E. CRITICALITY OF ASSUMPTIONS
The cost accounting methodology and assumptions in this
chapter are not critical to the application of the model.
Other assumptions would change the dollar values in the body
of the distribution of support functions across the mission
area but would not lessen the applicability or utility of
the model. The cost application here shows by example how
core resources are defined within the critical mass model
methodology.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Application of the model to Crows Landing suggests that
the critical mass concept can be applied to an operational
command if suitable staff commitment and expertise are
available to support it. The model may be more useful than
the current incremental approaches because of its utility in
the formulation, negotiation, and execution phases of
budgeting. It is designed primarily to improve budget
justification under fiscal stress. Direct linkage of
resources to mission accomplishment provides the framework
necessary to strengthen the command's negotiating strategy
at any juncture of the budgetary process. This format may
strengthen and protect the command from priorities imposed
by outside forces, or more likely will permit commands to
identify mission opportunity costs or losses resulting from
budget cuts. The critical mass model may be superior to
current budget formats in the execution phase because
resources are formally allocated based on mission priority
vice criteria such as fairness or eguity, politics, or
existing pro-rata share of the budget base.
B. DATA AVAILABILITY
In the test case, some historical cost accounting data
needed to apply the model were not readily available in
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existing accounting or manpower records. Each phase of the
model requires specific information regarding resource
utilization. The current systems for accounting for
resources are not designed to support this type of
application. Data are originally collected in sufficient
detail; however, the management reporting structure, the
UMRC, does not reproduce that level of detail in its output
format. Current archiving and reporting systems need to be
reworked to enable ready access to needed data to adapt the
model to Navy-wide use.
C. LIMITATIONS
The major problem in applying the model to a command is
lack of availability of needed data. The command does not
have the data readily available in existing reporting
systems. Reluctance to generate and furnish the data for
this type of research may be attributed to two causes.
First, it is difficult and time consuming to develop systems
to document the needed information in sufficient detail.
Therefore, budget planners and executors who believe that
existing systems adequately support the budget process do
not have incentive to volunteer the resources needed for
this task. Second, the current budgeting climate is
characterized by a fear of budget cuts. A command that has
not felt the impact of reductions may be uncooperative in
providing data perceived to be threatening because it might
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justify a shift in funding priorities so that the command
would lose budget share.
D. ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION FEASIBILITY
It is unlikely that a radical change in the budget
process such as that implied by the critical mass concept
will be accepted in defense applications without significant
additional testing. Until steady state or decreased funding
has significant negative impact on command programs, it will
be difficult to convince potential users of the utility of a
different system, especially one that ignores the premise of
incrementalism. However, budgeting for critical mass is not
offered as an alternative to PPBS . Rather, it is intended
as a command-level approach that would be implemented at the
discretion of a comptroller, e.g., in an installation or a
command. As such, the command may strengthen its budgetary
program by developing an internal data base to support
critical mass/core resource identification.
Implementation of budgeting for critical mass at the
installation, type command, or fleet level would require
modification of existing cost accounting systems. It would
also require a comprehensive review of the current mission
assignment policies and practices. Since information is not
a free good, an analysis of the utility of the critical
mass/core resource model for decision making should precede
any change.
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E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The application of the critical mass model to a single-
mission command generated a distribution of support
functions over a mission area. The next step in the process
of validating the model is application to a more complex
command with significant interdependencies among missions
and mission components.
The model, thus applied, may be superior to current
methods of budget formulation and execution. A comparison
between budget execution under the critical mass methodology
and current practices should be undertaken to test this
hypothesis.
To evaluate critical mass application, accounting
systems need to be designed to support the distribution of
resources among mission components or support functions.
The need for such systems is recognized in some communities,
and the issue is the topic of current research in limited
applications such as the P-3 flight hour program [Blake,
1988]. Attempts to design such systems require expertise in
the various mission fields as well as cost accounting to
create a new system or modify the reporting in current
systems to provide the detail necessary to allocate costs
accurately to mission components. The level of aggregation
of costs for centrally provided functions, such as payroll
and other support activities, plays an important role in
this determination; i.e., application of the model requires
45
that a number of choices be made on indirect cost
allocation. In addition, a separate system may be needed to
link core resources to classified missions.
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